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Abstract
This study investigates challenges posed by
Information and Communication Technologies
(ICTs) in the enactment of Information Systems (IS)
project control. Using the control perspective
developed by the sociologist John Law, we conducted
an interpretive study of an Enterprise Resource
Planning System implementation at a large public
university system. From our investigation, four
salient insights emerge. These insights are
accompanied by corresponding assertions that
demonstrate how ICTs, through varied forms of
involvement, may challenge IS project control
enactment. We integrate these insights for deeper
illumination and conclude with contributions and
implications of this study.

1. Introduction and Motivation: ICTs
and Enactment of IS Project Control
The issue of control in IS projects is an important
one, because it is one of the key factors involved in
the ultimate success of projects [11]. Control has
been defined “as the set of mechanisms used to
motivate individuals to act in a way that is consistent
with organizational objectives” [14, p. 489].
Generally, research on IS project control understands
ICTs as playing the role of “communication and
control systems that are standard, compatible, and
reliable [emphasis added]” [2, p. 64] that aid in the
implementation of control by controllers.
In IS literature, technologies and their associated
techniques and procedures thus provide for the set of
mechanisms
to
ensure
normativity
with
organizational objectives. Control research has seen
substantial work within the IS discipline; however, a
few blind spots in this literature can be discerned. For
example, in a fairly recent review of control literature
in IS, it has been observed that “existing research
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primarily studies the contextual antecedents and
performance consequences of control modes and
amounts, and thus focuses on control portfolio
configurations” [28, p. 741]. As a response to this
limitation, current research is engaging more with the
notion of control enactment (beyond just control
modes and their antecedents/outcomes). Control
enactment captures how control issues are played out
in an organizational setting, such as through
dynamics between controllers and controlees [12].
Our study adds to this emerging stream of research
on control enactment [e.g., 20], but with a rather
unique perspective. We propose that apart from
humans being controllers or controlees, ICTs could
also be viewed in a similar fashion. Therefore, we
extend the control enactment literature by showing
how ICTs can serve as controllers and controlees or
can interfere in how control enactment takes place
between controllers and controlees. For example, we
show how ICTs, when subjected to being controlees,
can also “rebound” and try to become controllers –
thus shaping the dynamics of control enactment.
Treating ICTs as unexpected shapers of
organizational dynamics has been studied in prior
research [25] and our study follows the same
approach by assigning agency to nonhumans like
ICTs. For this purpose, we use the control
perspective proposed by the British sociologist John
Law [16, 17], and investigate the following research
question: How can ICTs shape enactment of IS
project control, especially in unexpected ways?
Specifically, we investigate how roles of ICTs in the
enactment of control emerge and change over time,
especially in an unexpected (and often undesired)
manner. This change could be the result of actions by
actors to be controlled [21], unintended technological
failure [13], or complex interactions between human
choices and/or operations of technology [7]. For
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example, ICTs which are regarded as tools for
enforcing organizational form and control, may
produce unintended disruptive effects and radically
change pre-determined outcomes (i.e., control
objectives) by enforcing novel/disruptive innovations
[19]. Such unintended effects of ICTs often
compromise control enactment in IS projects. Our
study thus extends insights beyond the view that
ICTs help in systematically enabling project control
[22]. We show that ICTs can be “disobedient” and
can try to warp control enactment in IS projects.

2. The Theoretical Lens of this Study:
Law’s Control Perspective
For key definitions and concepts in Law’s control
perspective [16, 17], please refer to Table 1 (all tables
are included at the end). Law explains control as
being exercised by, through, and over interactions
amongst actors forming parts of actor-networks. An
actor-network for exercising control contains the
controlling actors or focal actors, the actors over
whom control must be exercised, and the actors that
exercise control on behalf of the controlling actor
(called envoys). Envoys create inscriptions and
envelopes to help them pursue the interest of the
focal actors. The focal actors must exercise control
over the other actors in the network to induce the
latter to play roles in which they take actions to
accomplish the objectives set for the actor-network.
An important process in this regard is
punctualization.
When–through the process of punctualization–groups
of actors become highly aligned in terms of their
interests and actions, they can be treated by the
controlling actor as a single actor that serves as a
resource in a larger network.
However,
punctualization requires successful translation of the
actors in the actor-network by the focal actor.
Notably, in Law’s perspective of control,
punctualization is a process marked by struggles [17],
because actors may be resistant (or may later become
resistant) to the objectives for which control is being
exercised. Often translation requires the passage of
an actor through the obligatory passage point, beyond
which the actor subscribes to the interests of the focal
actors. However, in some cases, the actors in the
actor-network may reverse this passage; in such
cases, the network may become de-punctualized.
Law's control perspective differs from that found in
most IS project control studies in multiple ways.
Control for Law is a process with potentially
uncertain objectives and outcomes and disavows

technological and social determinism. Notably,
Law’s perspective does not distinguish between
human and non-human actors. Thus, ICTs, as nonhuman actors can play as important a role in
exercising (or compromising) control enactment.
This is a primary reason why we embrace Law’s
perceptive, as it allows us to ascribe a pivotal role to
ICTs.

3. The Empirical Study
We conducted an interpretive case study [27] to
investigate our research question using Law’s control
perspective. This case describes the process to
implement three generations of the enterprise
resource planning system (named ERP-Star) at the
Varied University System (or VUS) (pseudonyms are
used for anonymity). The four VUS universities
include U1 University, U2 University, U3 University,
and U4 University or U1, U2, U3, and U4,
respectively.
VUS is overseen by a board of regents (BOR). The
BOR guides VUS and makes high-level decisions.
The chancellor is charged with implementing the
BOR’s decisions, while being U1’s president. The
chancellor and his/her high-ranking subordinates
comprise the university system administration or UA.
Each university has its own administration, led by a
president who enjoys a high level of discretion in
governing their universities and members of the
faculty and staff (FS) who work there. However, each
president is subordinate to the BOR and subject to
VUS policies.

3.1. Conducting the Study: Using the Cole
and Avison 2007 hermeneutical
framework
This entire research study, including the initial
formulation of inquiry, to the analysis of case data
through which we developed the ultimate theoretical
assertions was based upon completing the
hermeneutic circle, a central idea in interpretive
research, as advised by Klein and Myers [15]. This
principle calls for researchers to engage in a process
following the principle that human understanding
occurs through the iterative act of moving between a
whole and interdependent parts comprising that
whole [15]. In particular, Cole and Avison [6]
provide a framework to conduct hermeneutic
research which our study uses (see Table 2). Data
was mainly collected as semi-structured interviews
(33 initial and 34 follow up) with key project
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stakeholders. Additional sources (e.g., newspaper
articles emails, etc.) were also collected. Analysis
proceeded along the Cole and Avison guidelines,
informed by Law’s control perspective.

4. Empirical Analysis: The Case Insights
This section distills the key insights from our analysis
of the ERP-Star case, beginning with challenges to IS
project control from ICTs that hindered other actors’
understanding of the project.

4.1. Insight 1. ICTs Hindering IS Project
Control
by
Clouding
Actors’
Understandings of Projects’ Status
Viewed through Law’s perspective, the VUS case
sheds new light on challenges to identifying problems
and their root causes, in part due to the involvement
or lack of involvement of multiple ICTs, as well as
relations among them. In other words, ICTs used for
such purposes failed to live up to focal actors’
expectations of the faithfulness of such envoys.
This behavior of ICTs as unfaithful envoys appeared
to occur through at least two channels. First, the
controlling actor enrolled a copy of organizational
data that was insufficiently comprehensive or
outdated into a relationship as part of the envelope of
an envoy, ERP-Star’s testing version. However, this
action was unsuccessful. A UA member provided an
example:
“We tested that [a cancellation for nonpayment
process in ERP-Star]…but because we didn’t test it
on the whole population, we missed some things that
it was doing that we really didn’t want it to do. It
overlooked canceling some groups of students that
we did want canceled”
Second, the controlling actor and members of the FS
differed in their understanding of what components
were needed to provide accurate results to support
testing.
The controlling actors, the UA and
implementation team (IT), understood that a certain
set of elements were those needed for effective
testing (e.g., ERP-Star’s testing version and testing
plans). However, a U3 manager (part of FS)
contended that he did not have access to a report
needed for accurate results:
“…we can’t actually see the effect it’s [entering
data] having on the system [ERP-Star] without

having a report. So you kinda felt like you were
testing with like half the tools that you needed.”
In these instances of the enrollment of envoys to be
used to understand project status, the result was
unsatisfactory. This envoy, a testing version of ERPStar, had the capacity to provide accurate accounts of
project status. However, thanks to the enrollment of
or failure to enroll other actors, it took on the role of
‘deceiver.’ In other words, this envoy posed a
challenge to control by hindering actors’ capacity to
develop an accurate understanding of problems the
projects faced and slowed the diagnosis of such
problems’ causes. Based upon these insights, we
offer the first assertion:
Assertion1. ICTs enrolled to monitor and identify
project problems can provide deceptively
favorable views of projects; creating these
deceptive views can delay problem resolution,
which can interfere with efforts to punctualize a
system such as ERP-Star, and possibly lead to
additional project costs.

4.2. Insight 2. Data Stored/Processed by
ICTs
Compromising
Actors’
Supportive Roles in IS Projects
Data, as an actor, was influential in compromising
control in project settings. Primarily, Data impeded
actors’ efforts to induce other actors to comply with
the objectives of the former actors. First, the absence
of complete data showed to FS as part of training
created an impediment for the successful
implementation process by compromising actors’
support. For example, an U1 academic advisor noted:
“Because in the training they said, ‘Okay, in order to
view student data, this is where you go. But you
can’t view it yet. It’s not – all the data is not
converted yet. You can’t do this.’”
Had this data been available in the training version of
ERP-Star, this member of FS suggested that FS
would have been more supportive of the
implementation process. An associate dean at U2
recalled an instance of distrusting Data, which
ultimately extended to distrusting ERP-Star itself.
“The error rate [of data] was in the neighborhood of
70% and that is NOT a good neighborhood. Were
the data put into the system incorrectly? Did ERPStar simply not identify the correct data? Both?
Neither? I will likely never know. However, it was
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such drastically poor data [emphasis added] that set
the perception that one could not trust ERP-Star
data…We simply could not believe anything ERPStar produced. It is this complete mistrust of ERPStar [emphasis added] that has the greatest impact
on our work.”
Data also presented challenges for the actor-network
assembled by the UA and the IT due to lacking
particular characteristics desired by other actors. The
interactions that concern us are those of which data is
a part (e.g., training FS members), entailing activities
intended to contribute to control of the project.
Drawing upon Law’s perspective, control can be
understood as successful translation of actors in an
actor network by the focal actor(s). Also, translation
has four moments (please see Table 1)–
problematization, interessement, enrollment, and
mobilization. In this case, the translation of the other
actors (e.g., FS) by the key actors (e.g., UA and IT)
was achieved up to a certain point. In Law’s language
of control, problematization, interessement, and
enrollment were successful. However, mobilization
was hampered by Data as is evidenced above. Thus,
Data created an impediment to the control envisioned
by the focal actors. The major ramification of this
was that other actors’ buy-in of the implementation
process suffered because of Data. So, while these
actors were problematized, interessed, and enrolled
by the focal actors to support the implementation
process, they started to distrust Data and ERP-Star as
a result. Hence, we propose our second assertion:
Assertion 2: Data stored/processed by ICTs may
become an impediment to control objectives;
specifically, it can lead to incomplete translation
by hampering mobilization and so create distrust
in the ICT itself by actors in the actor-network.

4.3. Insight 3. Project Control and ICTs:
Negotiating with ICTs and Accepting
Compromises
The IT tried to use different ICTs beyond ERP-Star
as additional envoys to interess and enroll actors into
the project and mobilize them in support of the
projects. While one ICT (Microsoft Project) acted as
an obedient enabler of project control, the
involvement of another ICT was more problematic.
Actors (e.g., the IT) had implemented a ‘dashboard’
in response to a delay in the U2 Student
Administration application upgrade. This Microsoft
Excel-based tool was planned to give its users a

more-complete, high-level view of project status.
The problem that this plan faced was that the
dashboard had competition.
An U1 manager
described the competing list used by programmers:
“You can see…a number of items that are not on our
list. This was the beginning of our effort to capture
all those on the dashboard and to eliminate shadow
tracking with secret information.”
It was necessary to reconcile the two views of the
project status to reduce the likelihood of
misunderstanding that would hinder the effectiveness
of efforts to punctualize ERP-Star. The
punctualization of ERP-Star, as we shall see in later,
was a primary control objective for the projects. In
Law’s terms, this negotiation process, as part of
translating actors, made it possible for the dashboard
to play its intended role after a time.
The negotiation with ICTs did not stop here. While
ICTs could be turned into obedient members (i.e.,
obedient controlees) of the projects’ actor-network,
they could also be stubborn. It was also the case that
controlling actors’ negotiation with an ICT could
result in the latter dictating conditions of its
involvement in the project. In other words, this
negotiation for the ICT’s involvement carried costs
for controlling actors. An example of this costly
negotiation is the involvement of the technology
known as QUANT in the process.
QUANT was a packaged software technology
intended to move modifications to ERP-Star into the
production environment and to track the status of
work on such modifications. Originally, QUANT
was intended by actors leading technical aspects of
the projects effort to transfer large numbers of
changed elements or patches into the ERP-Star
production environment. The IT had already learned
(from another client) that this might not be possible:
“The subject of large volumes of objects came up
specifically with trying to use QUANT to migrate the
ERP-Star vendor’s updates and fixes patches into
application environments. They the other client
explained to us that they had attempted this several
times and found that the product bogged down and
would not handle the volume...”
Again, QUANT refused to function under the
condition of high volumes identified by the other
client. For VUS personnel to receive other benefits
that QUANT could offer (e.g., allowing monitoring
of modifications made to ERP-Star), a compromise
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was required.
We see that QUANT was a
disobedient piece of software that could not be used
in all the originally desired ways. Specifically, ICTs
such as QUANT demanded negotiations from the
focal actors for an altered and reduced role (i.e., the
controlee turned into a controller). In other words,
they contributed to the punctualization of ERP-Star
only when their “demands” were met. Crucially,
these ICTs demanded a price for their “obedience” in
supporting the projects’ objectives – one of which
was to punctualize ERP-Star into a resource as we
see later in the meta-theme.
Considered in light of Law’s work and the related
literature, the concept of disobedient, non-human
actors is not a foreign one [17, 18]. The steps of
translation to gain the compliance of an actor may
entail force, persuasion, and negotiation.
This
negotiation may be problematic, including incurring
additional costs. This concept of problematic
negotiation with ICTs provides the basis for the
following assertion:
Assertion 3: ICTs, intended for use in controlling
a project, may be potentially used as envoys for
punctualizing key actors; however, such ICTs may
negotiate their “price” for their obedience;
specifically, this may result in additional costs for
the project either in the procurement of new
resources or the imposition of dilatory procedures.

4.4. Insight 4. ERP-Star’s Adversarial
Relationships with other ICTs and ICT
components
Through much of the case timeline, ERP-Star was
engaged in adversarial relationships with other ICTs
or ICT components. The common effect of these
clashes appeared to be compromising ERP-Star’s
status as a punctualized actor that could serve as a
resource for the controlling actors and others. We
consider here three examples: ERP-Star’s
relationship with Emblem, the relationship between
ERP-Star and e-Manage, and the relationship of
ERP-Star with data to be entered into it.
The U3 administration group saw Emblem as
superior to ERP-Star, as one manager explained:
“…from a satisfaction point of view, from a business
needs point of view, our product [Emblem] is still
superior to what ERP-Star can do…we can’t see
anything that would add value…for us to be
transferring to ERP-Star.”

Characteristics such as these contributed to U3’s
success in gaining the BOR’s permission to use
Emblem in place of ERP-Star. Emblem effectively
challenged ERP-Star’s place in the project’s actornetwork. Rather than being the one solution being
implemented to solve the problems at VUS, ERP-Star
entered into a relationship with Emblem in which
both could serve as such effective solutions.
In the instance of E-Manage, ERP-Star again
compared unfavorably to it. One student interviewed
by the U1 newspaper offered this criticism of ERPStar:
“It has caused me nothing but problems," a student
said "It has been a huge inconvenience for me in
preparing for this upcoming semester, and it has held
me back from getting things done, which would have
been much easier to do using the old system [EManage]."”
Lastly, ERP-Star’s production versions contributed to
conflict with ICT components. For example, at U2, a
member of the FS working to recruit students
recalled ERP-Star’s refusal to accept data in Excel
format:
“You have them [data on prospective students] in
[an] Excel spreadsheet…40,000 names or 100,000
names…to send them direct mail…and then you don’t
have it in the prospect database [an ERP-Star
component], because there’s no way to upload the
thing, you know, fairly easily, without having to
manually enter all those names…”
To overcome this obstacle U2 FS had to undertake a
workaround of manually entering the data. In
addition, a U2 faculty member recalled another
barrier imposed by ERP-Star:
“The big problem with ERP-Star…is [that it is] so
rigid that it makes liars out of us all. We
kind of
had to figure out how to schedule our classes.”
Members of U2’s FS had to provide ERP-Star with
fabricated enrollment information or else ERP-Star
did not reserve classrooms (i.e., ERP-Star was
“controlling” their actions). It is interesting to note
that this step assisted members of FS to draw upon
ERP-Star as a taken-for-granted resource though not
as intended by the UA and IT, while simultaneously
interfering with ERP-Star’s ability to provide
accurate reporting (a goal of the controlling actors).
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Lastly, members of FS at U4 also experienced ERPStar’s ‘refusal’ to accept another format of data entry:
which letter grades faculty could enter for students.
A U4 manager explained the challenge that ERP-Star
posed:
“…it’s a mod [modification to ERP-Star’s code] that
was written for U2…U2 had a mod that would
prevent the issuance of a W. Well, we want to have a
W…for grades for faculty…but, because of that mod,
it was preventing us from being able to do that.”
These barriers to forming relationships with ICT
components (e.g., forms of data to be entered)
stemmed from inscriptions that ERP-Star carried,
having been inscribed by its vendor or through the
modification that project actors made to earlier
production versions to meet a need of U2’s FS.
While these inscriptions could be overcome with
manual
workarounds,
entering
fabricated
information, and additional coding, they initially
contributed to difficulties in maintaining ERP-Star’s
status as a punctualized actor. Based upon these
three variants of ERP-Star’s conflict with other
technologies, we offer our fourth assertion:
Assertion 4: An ICT, intended by controlling
actors to serve as a punctualized resource, may be
compromised by its adversarial relationships with
other ICTs and ICT components; the development
of these adversarial relationships may result from
the ICTs excluded from an actor-network, or
inscriptions written into the ICT to be
punctualized.

5. Integration:
The
Challenge
Punctualization for Enacting
Project Control

of
IS

These four insights into challenges that ICTs can
pose to IS project control enactment indicate the
existence of an underlying meta-theme that can
holistically capture how ICTs compromise control
enactment. This common theme points to the role and
ramifications of punctualization in actor-networks.
As discussed in Table 1, punctualization entails the
changing of an actor-network that makes up a part of
a more extensive actor-network [18]. Through this
changing, this actor-network becomes, in effect, a
single actor. Thus, punctualization is a key technique
for focal actors to exercise control, by reducing
heterogeneity, and the punctualized actor often serves
as a consolidated resource for control [26].

In our context, controlling the ERP-Star
implementation and upgrade process was an
important endeavor in the eyes of the key controlling
actors. From a punctualization standpoint, this
involved turning ERP-Star into a taken-for-granted
resource, maintaining ERP-Star in this condition, and
attempting to use this resource for furthering the
control objectives established for the process.
Throughout much of the process, achieving effective,
sustained punctualization was a key focus of the
work of the controlling actors. In effect, the
controlling actors desired that ERP-Star would
operate as an “obedient” controlee by being fully
punctualized.
However, ERP-Star was punctualized to an extent; at
the same time, other elements of ERP-Star were not,
presenting challenges to the controllers’ objectives.
Thus, it would be more accurate to say that ERP-Star
exhibited the quality of being simultaneously
punctualized and un-punctualized. In other words, it
faithfully played the role of a controlee at times,
while at other times, it assumed a more controlling
role.
Instances of the ICT (here components of ERP-Star’s
production
versions)
appeared
to
reach
punctualization and the desired, taken-for-granted
status while co-existing with others that did not attain
a punctualized state. In response, controlling actors
appeared to seek to make corrections to strengthen
ERP-Star as a resource. This entailed bringing in
new actors, such as additional technology or other
artifacts (e.g., a help guide) as envoys of the
controlling actors.
Doing so was sometimes
problematic. For example, this help guide did not
perform as expected and required modifications to
enhance its effectiveness. Examined from Law’s
perspective, the actors, not limited to the controlling
actors, seeking to use ERP-Star, attempted to enroll
additional sometimes problematic actors into the
actor-network or to alter the enrollment of other
actors (e.g., the testing version of ERP-Star). In
some cases, these attempts led to the desired effects,
while in others they did not.
Punctualization creates a black box that is assumed to
be functional [3], i.e., fully compliant with control
objectives. It is because of this that punctualization
has always been a key issue in project management
especially related to IS implementations [4, 25]. As
punctualization is often synonymous with the
reduction of a network’s heterogeneity, it makes it
simpler and easier for the focal actors to enforce
control [25]. Therefore, the controller prefers
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punctualization because of its inherent simplicity in
enforcing control [4]. However, punctualization is
subject to threats.
Therefore, punctualization
attempts may not always be successful. In other
words, punctualization may result in increased
control for the controlling actors, which is why they
prefer it, but the very attempt at punctualization may
create negative outcomes and compromise control
enactment simultaneously. Thus, punctualization has
a complex and interesting relationship with control,
as evidenced by this study. In line with our
discussion, we formally explicate our meta-theme as
the following set of assertions:
a.

b.

c.

Efforts of focal actors in establishing
control by punctualizing an ICT may not
wholly
successful
due
to
be
constraints/resistances established by
other actors, including versions of the
ICT itself; consequently, it can be difficult
for an ICT to obtain the status of a
punctualized resource to enable control.
Strategies to enforce punctualization
might be successful, but they can often
result in the misappropriation of the ICT
and hinder accomplishing project
objectives.
As a result, an ICT can exist
simultaneously in a punctualized and unpunctualized state that both enables and
challenges control of the project by the
focal actors.

6. Contributions and Implications
6.1. Contributions to research

We contribute to the IS project control literature by
offering a richer view of the possible role of an ICT
(an ERP, in this case) in the enactment of control.
Prior literature has argued that ICTs help enable
controls [2, 22] due to the fact that they can act as
consolidated resources and can tighten controls [26].
However, in this study we see that ERP-Star never
reached the consolidated status of “punctualization”.
It existed both in a punctualized and an unpunctualized state. In other words, the ICT was in a
state of flux, quite distant from the reliable and
systematic conceptualization of ICTs found in the
extant project control literature [2, 22]. As a result,
the ICT compromised the enactment of control
objectives and did not subscribe to the dominant view
that ICTs are mechanisms to enforce control [23]. In
reality, our study shows that ICTs are emergent [9]
and often switch to being a controller when humans
try to enforce/use it as a controlee.

In addition, the insights and corresponding assertions
themselves make important contributions to the
literature on project control enactment. Assertion 1
contributes to the IS project control literature by
providing a richer view of ICTs’ relationship with a
key element of enacting control: monitoring project
status. Assertion 2, related to the challenges posed by
data stored/processed/generated by ICTs, may benefit
multiple literatures, such as the information
management literature [1]. This is because these
assertions discuss the role of data which, in turn,
gives rise to information when this “data is classified,
summarized, transferred or corrected in order to add
value” [8, p. 6]. Assertion 3 suggests that one role
that ICTs may play in the project control is that of a
disobedient actor with whom other actors must
negotiate. In this case, the ICT assumes the role of
the controller. Also, we find that a consequence of
this disobedience may be additional costs to the
original controller stemming from negotiating with
the disobedient ICT. Finally, Assertion 4 calls for
researchers to take an expanded view of ICTs
involved in project control, a view that includes
versions of the ICT being implemented. This
assertion reminds researchers to not take for granted
the influence of different versions of the ICT being
implemented on the operation of project control.
These versions of the ICT being implemented, in
these adversarial relationships with other ICTs or
their components, may compromise project control
enactment in multiple ways such as by reducing
employees’ support for the implementations. Overall,
these insights also contribute to the research stream
on control enactment [5, 29]), which seeks to explain
how project control operates. This study furthers the
extant research on control enactment by showing how
ICTs can interfere with the operation of enactment
efforts.

6.2. Contributions to practice
This paper makes two contributions to practice. First,
organizational
resources
(e.g.,
pre-existing
organizational data) may themselves have disruptive
influences when ICTs “refuse” to perform their
assigned tasks. Thus, this study unearths challenges
that practitioners may face in projects and
accordingly alerts them to take appropriate actions.
Second, this study suggests the possibility that using
an actor as a proxy, standing in for another actor,
may not have expected results. Practitioners may
want to choose proxies wisely so that the desired
objectives are not compromised.
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7. Future Research Directions
First, it could be valuable to conduct a follow-up
study in another setting that has implemented or is in
the process of implementing a complex information
system like ERP-Star. This follow-up study could
test the assertions presented in this paper. A variant
of this follow-up study alternative could be one
conducted in a multinational corporation. Projects
conducted by these corporations have been an
increasingly common means for these organizations
to develop and/or implement information systems
[10]. For that reason, this follow-up study could
provide a potentially useful complement to the
existing studies of control enactment. Such studies
could also enable researchers to contribute to
understanding ICTs’ interfering roles in control
enactment.
To conclude, this work has highlighted how various
ICTs challenge and shape IS project control
enactment. We hope that this work will energize
future research to further investigate the nuances of
the roles played by ICTs in the enactment of control
in new (as well as existing) IS projects.
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Table 1. Concepts in Law’s Perspective on Control as applied in IS literature, such as in Sarker et al. (2006)

Concept
Actor
Actor-Network
Control
Envoy
Envelope
Inscription
Punctualization
Translation
Problematization
Interessement
Enrollment
Mobilization

Descriptions of the concept
An entity that takes actions influencing the operation of control.
A collection of actors assembled into relationships to act in concert to accomplish the objectives of
control.
A process used by a controlling actor to accomplish objectives by employing the efforts of other actors
assembled into an actor-network.
An actor who exercises control on behalf of the controlling actor.
A structure composed of an envoy's relationships with other actors, as well as the envoy himself. The
envelope influences the envoy’s capacity to exercise control.
A piece of knowledge that has been converted into an easily reproducible and transportable form.
Inscriptions may influence the actions that an envoy takes.
“Treating a heterogeneous network as an individual actor to reduce network complexity” (Sarker et al.,
2006, p. 56)
“The process of alignment of the interests of a diverse set of actors with the interests of the focal actor”
(Sarker et al., 2006, p. 56).
“The first moment of translation, during which a focal actor defines identities and interests of other
actors that are consistent with its own interests, and establishes itself as an obligatory passage point
(OPP), thus rendering itself indispensable” (p. 56)
“The second moment of translation, which involves negotiating with actors to accept definition of the
focal actor” (Sarker et al., 2006, p. 56)
“The third moment of translation, wherein other actors in the network accept (or get aligned to) interests
defined for them by the focal actor” (Sarker et al., 2006, p. 56)
The fourth moment of translation, in which the focal actor attempts to ensure that speakers properly
represent the interests for which they are to speak and do not betray them. These speakers are to
represent the one or more objectives that the focal actor wants to foster.

Table 2. Using the hermeneutic framework developed by Cole and Avison (2007) to guide our study
Stage

Key sub-stages

Understanding

The explication of prejudices

Explanation

Key Activities/Considerations in each
sub-stage
Unearth the dominant motivations of the
researchers to determine literature to be
reviewed

Formulating lines of inquiry

Determine the ‘parts’ that are key to the
‘whole’ which will later guide the data
collection

Conducting

“identify

the

active

“normal”

and

“abnormal”

Application
to
this
research study
The researchers’ dominant
motivation
was
to
investigate the challenging
roles of ICTs in enacting
IS project control.
The “parts” here are Law’s
individual concepts of
control discussed in Table
1, linked to the “whole”
which is his overall
perspective of control. As
shown below, our data
collection and analysis use
those “parts.”
Interviews focused on
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Stage

Key sub-stages
interview

Interpretation

Key Activities/Considerations in each
sub-stage
behaviors” (p. 825) and statements used “as
reality creating activities through which
behaviors, circumstances and persons are
cast in instances of cultural and technical
significance” (p. 825)

Analyzing a priori codes

Categorization, identification of tools to
analyze data, and further interviews

Breakdown of prejudices

“researchers…re-assess their particular
understanding of the nature of component
phenomena” (p. 826).

Fusion of horizons

"The aim is to create, through shared
meanings, new concepts that transcend
originally held meanings” (p. 826).

Application
to
this
research study
understanding whether the
various ICTs behaved as
they
were
expected
with
the
(consistent
dominant perspective of
control enactment) or did
not. Interviews were also
focused on bringing out
the actual (real) reactions
of key implementation
stakeholders.
Data was categorized
based on the concepts
presented in Law’s control
perspective. (e.g., actors).
The same participants
were interviewed multiple
times, when possible, to
facilitate
understanding
how their interpretations
changed over time.
The
re-assessment
occurred through follow
up interviews with the
subjects,
where
the
researchers’
initial
interpretation of the events
(in the previous stage)
were presented to them,
leading to further changes
in interpretation.
The
researchers’
understandings
are
distilled in the form of 4
insights,
with
corresponding abstractions
(assertions). These insights
were integrated into a
meta-understanding for a
more sophisticated insight.
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